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PREFACE 
A tragic event happened on the eve of February 27th. Boris Nemtsov, a well-known Russian 
politician, was shot and killed in cold blood on the streets of Moscow. During the last months of his 
life Nemtsov had been working on a report about Russian interference in Ukraine, including a 
chapter on lies and propaganda in which he emphasis the position of television in Putin’s rule. 
“Vladimir Putin”, the report states, “managed to create a telecentric state in which all public 
institutions from the church to the army have been replaced by their televised images.”1 But not 
only has television become a display of a Kremlin-friendly reality, the Russian state-media as a 
whole have become instruments for public management. This is also described in Nemtsov’s report 
with the example of the disaster with MH17. “After the downing of the Boeing, Russian media began 
to resound with different versions of the tragedy that had happened. Essentially, the Kremlin 
propaganda gave the signal for a special information [intelligence] operation aimed at creating a 
kind of "smokescreen" around the investigation into the reasons for the crash of the Malaysian 
plane.”2 This smokescreen has in the meantime drifted away public accusation from the Kremlin-
backed separatists and made Russians blame Kiev for shooting down the plane.3  
Paradoxically, a similar smokescreen campaign of media manipulation started right after Nemtosv  
died of the shots fired in his back, right next to the Kremlin walls. In the hours after his murder 
multiple official theories about his death were covered in the state-media, except ignoring the 
possibility of government or official involvement. Instead, media discourse shifted the blame 
towards radical Muslims and, not surprisingly, Ukraine. 
These instances of inconceivable media attention, combined with the international involvement, 
have generated a large response in Western countries, from governments, journalists and society 
alike. Because since the military escalation in Ukraine many other countries that Russia regards as 
within its sphere of influence feel threatened by Russian interference in their national media, 
addressing not only the Russian minorities but also in some cases also national majorities. As a 
reaction Western countries have intensified their efforts to deal with this phenomenon of distorting 
media coverage. Even though Western focus is mainly on the implications for the public outside 
Russia, the issue of public manipulation is even more so the problem domestically. It is this internal 
media manipulation that this study will focus on. The instances mentioned above, as well as 
                                                             
1 I. Yashin & O. Shorina, eds., Putin. War (Moscow 2015) p. 9 
2 Ibidem. p. 44 
3 A. Luhn, ‘MH17: vast majority of Russians believe Ukraine downed plane, poll finds’, The Guardian, 30-07- 
2014, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/30/mh17-vast-majority-russians-believe-
ukraine-downed-plane-poll, last visited 25-09-2015 
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common practices in everyday Russian state-media, have been described in Western media as 
disinformation. It is this form of propaganda that this study will analyse.  
One of the problems, however, with the term disinformation is that up to date it has only been 
vaguely described, and clearly lacks extensive academic foundation. Even though this clear 
definition of disinformation is absent, many authors have however used it to describe Kremlin 
media tactics. Coverage of Nemtsov’s death and the downing of MH17 are just two explicit instances, 
some authors  use it in a broader sense to identify the Russian state-media as a whole. The guardian 
compared disinformation to “so much electronic chaff dropped out of the back of a Tupolev bomber 
to confuse an incoming missile”4, or should it be seen as longer-term effort to discredit any notion of 
truth? Shrouded in ambiguity the specifics of still haven’t been clearly described. 
This study will analyse the use of disinformation in Russia according to the following research 
question: How is disinformation applied in the coverage of the murder of Boris Nemtsov in the 
Russian state media? As has become clear above, to answer this question first a substantive 
description of disinformation has to be established, for in academic literature on propaganda 
studies it is a rather undescribed subject. Therefore the research question exists of three sub-
questions: What are the main characteristics of disinformation? Are these characteristics, and 
therefore disinformation, present in Russian state-media? And to what extent is disinformation 
applied to the coverage of the murder of Nemtsov? 
The two elements that make this study needed have already been mentioned above. Not only 
the high international attention and occasional panic about Russian disinformation campaigns 
makes it an important topical issue, the main necessity comes from the fact that up to date no 
scholar has done extensive research to clarify on the description of disinformation. Other scholars 
that concentrate on propaganda acknowledge this, like for instance Jonathan Auerbach, editor of the 
Oxford Handbook of Propaganda: “Increasing globalization and growth in transnational 
communication networks… would all seem to combine to spell the end of propaganda as we know it. 
[And therefore] study of propaganda remains highly relevant and in all likelihood will continue to 
be a critical issue in the future.”5 With the emergence of large-scale disinformation this future is now 
more present than ever. This study will be among the first attempts at describing and analysing 
disinformation in an academic context. The criteria established in this study may therefore 
hopefully become a starting point for future research. 
                                                             
4 Editorial, ‘The Guardian view on Russian propaganda: the truth is out there’, The Guardian, 02-03-2015. 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/02/guardian-view-russian-
propaganda-truth-out-there, last visited 25-09-2015 
5 J. Auerbach & R. Castronovo eds., The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda (Oxford, 2013) p. 8 
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The method of analysis consists of establishing a basis of academic definitions on disinformation 
and from there constructing the criteria needed for deeper analysis. The criteria will then serve as a 
backbone for the rest of the chapters. As mentioned above, this study will follow the path of three 
different sub-questions. In the first chapter the theoretical basis will be laid out using academic 
literature. This will cover the relation between propaganda and disinformation and gradually 
develop to a set of characteristics of disinformation. In the second chapter popular secondary 
literature and public policy papers about Russian disinformation will be evaluated against the 
theoretical background to establish an overview of the presence of disinformation through the eye 
of journalism and think-tanks. The third chapter will then analyse, by the hand of the information 
from the first chapters, the presence of disinformation in the coverage on the murder on Nemtsov 
by taking examples of primary sources from the Russian state-media in the first day after the 
murder. 
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CHAPTER I SETTING THE FRAMEWORK: DISINFORMATION 
DEFINED 
In the recent year and a half, publications that have tried to describe Russian media practices have 
often used the word disinformation. While the term had been out of fashion for over 25 years, 
vanished together with the Soviet Union and the Cold War that provoked these practices, in the 
backdrop of the conflict in Ukraine it suddenly re-emerged in popular discussion. However, as will 
be elaborated further below, the term “disinformation” has undergone a modern transformation. 
For more than a decade already, this shape shifting has been noticed and described by a handful of 
scholars. They declared that disinformation nowadays is widely used as a synonym for propaganda.6 
Somehow then both terms, propaganda and disinformation, arouse similar feelings of negative 
connotations and false, misleading, manipulative communication. In popular discussion however, 
the specifics of both terms often ends up neglected. As this study will research the topic of 
specifically disinformation, it cannot hide behind the ambiguity that surrounds these popular 
expressions.  
As this study will show, terms such as disinformation and propaganda, as well as many other 
words used to describe some sort of manipulation of the audience, are largely intertwined and 
difficult to define. Because this difficulty of definition remains a persistent factor throughout this 
study, transparency from the start will be helpful for the reader. This study will argue that 
disinformation is one of the many forms that fall under the umbrella term propaganda. This 
relationship will be more closely described in this chapter, as the reader will discover that it turns 
out to be quite problematic to define these two terms even in scientific discourse. Not only has 
disinformation been used to describe multiple practices which are entirely different from one 
another, but defining the umbrella term itself (propaganda) has been the cause of century-long 
debate. The root of that discussion lies in the fact that propaganda studies require a 
multidisciplinary approach. Because the boundaries between the many forms of propaganda and 
their parent-term are fluid regarding many criteria, the most important issues of this discussion will 
be described in the sections below.  
After establishing an idea about the scope and theories about propaganda, this chapter will 
quickly zoom in on the practice of disinformation. The form of disinformation this study will analyse 
is the more recently developed idea of influencing an audience by distracting it through information 
overload, as opposed to the form of disinformation that has mostly been used to describe a 
technique for covertly influencing the decision-making process in foreign governments by deflecting 
                                                             
6 S. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction (Westport, 2002) p. 110 
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the source of misleading information published in that country. The Soviet KGB professionalized 
this technique in the 20th century, naming it dezinformatsia.7 At the end of the first chapter this form 
of disinformation will be given some attention in order to clarify the existence of similarities in 
practice, and more importantly, to prove that they are, in theory, two completely distinct forms. To 
keep this distinction clear throughout this study, this older (KGB) description of disinformation will 
be referred to as dezinformatsia. Another terminology issue consists of the use of somewhat similar 
words to describe either similar, or rather distinct processes. The most persistent these is so-called 
misinformation, which has in the past been used to describe dezinformatsia, but also in recent 
popular articles to describe whatthis study defines as disinformation.8 Misinformation is also often 
used to differentiate between deliberately misleading information and “merely misguided or 
erroneous information.”9 Nuances in this terminology will be explained in more detail below. 
This chapter will establish the theoretical basis for the other chapters. Through a short 
introduction to the literature on propaganda it will gradually close in on disinformation and its 
characteristics. First, a short introduction will be given on the past century of multidisciplinary 
propaganda studies that have brought forward the literature for this study. Second, some light will 
be shed on the basics of the discussion within academia on the definition of propaganda which is 
still occurring. The issues discussed regarding the definition of propaganda are in many ways 
similar to the discussions on disinformation. Third, disinformation will be introduced by the 
connection between information and propaganda, and the similarities and differentiations authors 
make when describing disinformation. Fourth, various scholarly definitions and descriptions of 
disinformation will be discussed so as to distil a common base from which to look into 
disinformation in more detail. Fifth, having determined the key elements of disinformation, all 
characteristics of disinformation will be determined through a detailed evaluation of each 
characteristic, from means to message. This is in in line with the earlier descriptions as well as 
further research into sub-criteria. Finally, a comparison with Soviet dezinformatsia will be given to 
show that there are similarities, but more important, elemental differences. 
  
                                                             
7 G. Jowett & V. O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks, 2006) p. 22 
8 See L. Bittmann, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation (Virginia, 1985) 
9 Jowett & O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 22 
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1.1 FROM PROPAGANDA TO DISINFORMATION 
The collection of disciplines that have a distinct perspective on the study of propaganda is quite 
extensive. The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda, one of the most recent publications of a selection of 
essays on propaganda, comes up with a little as eleven subareas of propaganda studies: “art history, 
history, theology, communications, education, media studies, public relations, literary analysis, 
rhetoric, cultural theory and political science.”10 Even though this appears to be quite a collection of 
disciplines, they still omit other basic fields of research like psychology and philosophy. As the 
concept of propaganda enjoyed an unprecedented level of interest over the past century, the focus 
of propaganda research changed over time because of the multifariousness of the subject and 
changes in the scientific environment.11 This multidisciplinary attention has led to differentiating 
ideas on propaganda and has shown that the subject cannot be studied satisfactory from the 
perspective of a single discipline. In a short history of the shifting disciplinary attention in the past 
century the main literature on propaganda will be introduced below. 
The 20th century has seen the focus in propaganda studies shift from identifying propaganda 
in the first half of the century, to theorizing propaganda and empirical analysis in the second half. In 
the period before WWII the focus was mainly on identifying techniques “to help the intelligent 
citizen to detect and to analyse propaganda, by revealing the agencies, techniques, and devices used 
by the propagandist.”12 Much of this work was done by scholars associated with the Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis (IPA). Sociologist Alfred Lee and his wife published an often-quoted work on 
rhetorical analysis of propaganda in this period, which focussed on fallacies in the use of speech to 
distract from substantive argumentation. This is needed for analysing messages and argumentation 
but does not theorize or analyse propaganda as a phenomenon at all.  
After WWII the focus shifted to sociological research. An important account here is the work 
of Leonard Doob, sterling professor in Psychology at Yale, who pursued a similar goal as the IPA:  
“The ability to label something propaganda and someone a propagandist and a simultaneous insight 
into the fundamental nature of the process of propaganda will combine to render many kinds of 
propaganda less effective”.13 In contrast to Lee, however, Doob focuses on the psychological effect of 
the phenomenon, rather than on the structure of the message. The second half of the 20th century 
also saw a move away from these practical objectives. One of the most important works of this 
                                                             
10 Auerbach & Castronovo eds., The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda, p. 1-2 
11 practically all scholars agree on the emergence of propaganda awareness in the 20th century. See for 
instance G. Jowett and O’Donnell eds., Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays 
(Thousand Oaks, 2006) p. ix 
12 A. Lee & E. Lee eds., The Fine Art of Propaganda: A study of Father Coughlin’s speeches (New York, 1939) p. II 
13L. Doob, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique (New York, 1935) p. 5 
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period from a sociological perspective is from Jacques Ellul, probably the most influential scholar on 
propaganda, with his work called ‘Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes’. 
Near the end of the 20th century focus shifted to communication research. The most 
representative, most used, most reprinted and most frequently seen in education, is the 
communication handbook Propaganda and Persuasion by scholars Garth Jowett and Victoria 
O’Donnell. However, while their focus on communication and their at times rather oversimplified 
arguments and definitions make it useful for practical research or analysis, these same qualities also 
detract from further theorization. 
Some more recent literature, however, has proven to fill this theoretical gap in literature. 
Among the best works is Stanley Cunningham’s philosophical approach to the idea of propaganda, 
which evaluates all differentiating views from the past century. As Cunningham himself explains, it 
is “a conceptual analysis of just what propaganda is or how we should describe it.”14  It is this work 
that will be regarded as the main theoretical basis of this study. Not only because it proves to be the 
most extensive on the subject of disinformation, but because it is the finest evaluation of all authors 
named here. Another work from this new, reflective generation is by historian Oliver Thomson, who 
combines a doctorate in the history of propaganda with, interestingly, directing an advertisement 
agency. Also worth mentioning is the Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, which consists of a 
selection of essays, edited by Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo.  
There is no abundance of definitions of disinformation in literature. Most of the works that 
describe disinformation are in fact about dezinformatsia, mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. 
Even the widely used Jowett and O’Donnell only refer to this type of reflective source propaganda. 
Another problem is differing names for disinformation, which include, among others: 
misinformation, new propaganda, and propaganda of palaver. It is for this reason that when 
focussing on disinformation, other authors, some of whom not active in the field of propaganda but 
for instance political argumentation, will also be referred to. These include communication scientist 
Neil Postman, political scientist Robert Goodin, and an important work by political scientists and 
communication scholars James Combs and Dan Nimmo, which unfortunately was only available to 
the author in the form of paraphrases and quotes from Cunningham’s book. 
 
  
                                                             
14 See Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction 
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1.2 ACADEMIC DISCUSSION 
A short overview of the discussion surrounding propaganda studies and the definitions that the 
above mentioned authors have come up with is used to illustrate the fluidity of the concept of 
propaganda and to create a starting point for narrowing down the term disinformation, as 
propaganda as a whole should cover all different forms of malicious communication.15 Some 
understanding of the larger discussion on propaganda is also important because of its similarities 
with the much less documented discussion surrounding disinformation. This section will therefore 
be an introduction to the relationship between these two terms, which in recent times are being 
used interchangeably, and will reveal the importance of the criteria used in the rest of this study. Of 
these criteria deliberateness and falsity will prove to be among the most debated issues. 
The result of all the propaganda research of the past century is an interesting mix of 
definitions, most of them from a limited perspective and therefore insufficiently able to define 
propaganda as a whole. The multifariousness of the umbrella term propaganda makes it impossible 
to form a satisfying universal definition. Some scholars have admitted to this problem, such as Doob 
who has stated that because of this reason “a clear-cut definition of propaganda is neither possible 
no desirable.”16 Others have come up with definitions that may serve their field of study, but are 
based on a short-sighted view of the matter. This section will compare these definitions with one 
another, and set them against the more extensive descriptions supplied by the more critical scholars. 
Some scholars stress the necessity of intent in their definitions of propaganda. For instance 
Jowett and O’Donnell, who claim that their definition has been gaining popularity for a while now, 
focus on the purpose of the propaganda used, and therefore explicitly include deliberateness in their 
introduction: “Propaganda is the deliberate systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist.”17 This is quite like the definition given the IPA fifty years earlier: “an expression of 
opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of 
other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends” 18  For these scholars, 
communication scholars like Jowett and O’Donnell, and the early propaganda-fighters of the IPA 
alike, intent can indeed be the identifying characteristic of propaganda, however, many other 
scholars do not agree on the necessity of intent within propaganda. Thomson for instance claims 
that “it is unwise to insist on the words deliberate, or systematic in any definition of propaganda 
                                                             
15 Even this description is in many way not representative of propaganda, but it serves as a mental image. 
16 L. Doob , Public Opinion and Propaganda (Hamden, 1966) p.375 
17 Jowett & O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 7 
18 Lee & Lee eds., The Fine Art of Propaganda: A study of Father Coughlin’s speeches, p. 15 
11 
 
[for] too many great movements of mass persuasion have begun and continued without any master 
plan.”19 One of the ways in which Thomson’s argument can be considered correct is that propaganda 
messages can often, unwittingly, be further distributed and that the existence of a main 
propagandist is not a necessary precondition. This discrepancy is exactly what will come back in the 
discussion surrounding disinformation, because in many cases unintentional propaganda has the 
same effect as deliberate propaganda. Taking up deliberateness in the definition is therefore 
problematic because it would exclude many manifestations and forms of propaganda in advance. 
Another element of discussion is the need for information to be false in propaganda. Even 
though most scholars agree that information does not need to be false or misleading to be used as 
propaganda, when experts define propaganda the falsity condition often makes it into the definition. 
As an example of how pervasive these critical categorizations can be, the Oxford Dictionary on 
Media and Communication has included in its definition exactly these two debated criteria, intent 
and falsity. They define propaganda as: “Persuasive mass communication that filters and frames the 
issues of the day in a way that strongly favours particular interests; usually those of a government 
or corporation. Also, the intentional manipulation of public opinion through lies, half-truths, and the 
selective re-telling of history.”20 While it is definitely correct that some propaganda contains lies to 
persuade an audience, false information also makes propaganda vulnerable. Selective use of 
information is therefore more sustainable and just as effective. Thomson, among many others, 
therefore states: “if anything, it is easier for propaganda to be effective if it is based on the truth.”21  
That these criteria have proven rather problematic does not render them useless. Criteria 
are needed to divide between propaganda and “normal” forms of communication, or even more 
difficult division, between propaganda and education. Basically, what these discussions show is that 
propaganda is impossible to define in a comprehensive manner. That is also why, among others, 
Cunningham, Doob, and Auerbach and Castronovo refuse to come up with a single definition, but 
instead describe the practice of propaganda using about dozen individual characteristics. This study 
will not further elaborate on describing propaganda as a whole, as it would take up a completely 
different study. Instead it will elaborate on relevant subdivisions of propaganda that are used to 
define the certain characteristics specific for certain types of propaganda. It is in exactly these 
subdivisions where discussions have taken the shape of identifiable differentiations within 
propaganda.22  
                                                             
19 O. Thomson, Easily led: A History of Propaganda (Pheonix Mill, 1999) p. 3 
20 D. Chandler & R. Munday, Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication (Oxford, 2014), accessed online. 
21 Thomson, Easily led: A History of Propaganda, p. 3 
22 See for instance Jowett & O’Donnell (2006) pp. 16-26 
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SUBDIVISIONS OF PROPAGANDA 
Even though this study is about disinformation, some explanation of others forms that are 
subdivided under the umbrella term propaganda is important. It is possible to find many variations 
in names of propaganda forms, varying from rather explicit definitions of specific types like hotel 
propaganda23, to more general divisions between black and white propaganda. Fuzzy boundaries 
and overlapping remain present in all forms.24 Because of the focus on modern day Russia, not all 
subdivisions of propaganda are needed for this study. The discussion above can be found back in the 
division between “white” and “black” propaganda, where white is often described as communication 
“that is mostly true and/or whose sources are known or readily apparent”25 and black is often 
portrayed as "messages that are false erroneous or misleading, and/or whose source concealed or 
unknown.”26 As these instances show, it might be better to look at these criteria as scales, rather 
than boundaries. 
The scale that will prove to be important in this study, as a way of distancing disinformation 
form other forms of propaganda, is described by Jowett and O’Donnel as a symptom that is present 
in most other propaganda, namely some form of activated ideology, whether agitative or 
integrative.27 In other words: forms of propaganda that promote specific ideas. This activated 
ideology can be found for instance in two more specific forms of propaganda that Cunningham 
describes.  They give a more concrete picture of features of propaganda that might easily be found 
in the Russian media: hate propaganda, and integration propaganda. Hate propaganda, he states, has 
a specific aim: “the promotion of hate, dislike, contempt, and actions against a race, gender, or 
groups.28 Integration propaganda, Cunningham describes, are “those types of messages, interactions, 
or communication environments designed to unify, integrate, and harmonize a society, or which 
have that as their result.”29 As the sections below will show, it is the absence, or rather a high-level 
on the scale of absence of this activated ideology, that distinguishes disinformation from these other 
forms of propaganda. That will prove to be more important than dividing between the general terms 
of black and white. It is also Cunningham, who rather unsurprisingly, places disinformation, 
somewhere in the middle, “not unlike the ambiguity of grey propaganda.”30 
                                                             
23 Cunningham (2002), p. 71 
24 Ibidem, p. 75 
25 Ibidem, p. 67 
26 Ibidem, p. 67 
27 Jowett & O’Donnell (2006), p. 16 
28 Cunningham (2002), p. 70 
29 Ibidem, p. 66 
30 Ibidem, p. 68 
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 In the literature other subdivisions have been made on the type of medium the propaganda 
is making use of. However, according to the Oxford Handbook, even though “propaganda changes 
according to specific media, [it] cannot entirely be defined by the attributes of a given medium.”31 
Even though this division is important in some subareas of propaganda studies, for instance in 
propaganda that makes more use of art, whether it is film or fine arts, it is of less importance for this 
study as it will mainly focus on textual news items, or language used in television news or talk 
shows. Televised news, however, could possibly require more research into this matter if one would 
include visual imagery. 
 As some details about disinformation have already been introduced in this section, it now is 
time to focus solely on the subject of this study. The sections above have shed some light on the 
debates and definitions surrounding propaganda, and many of these issues will return in the next 
sections. 
1.3 DISINFORMATION 
The association with information is quite logically the first association a person will make when 
hearing the term disinformation. The prefix dis- which implies “having a privative, negative, or 
reversing force”32 combined with the word information, gives the idea of a paradoxical set of data 
that is passed onto the audience that somehow negatively and/or reversely informs. Information 
itself, moreover, is maybe even harder to define then propaganda. Therefore, together with the fact 
that disinformation has been used to describe multiple forms of propaganda, this semantic 
introduction, even though it is actually pointing in the right direction, will not be sufficient. It is the 
combination of propaganda and information that this study will analyse. The distinction between 
the two elements is, however, also an element that not all scholars agree on. This disagreement is 
mainly created by the difference between theory and practice. On the one hand are the radical 
thinkers, one of which Jacques Ellul, who states that there is no possibility of distinguishing between 
information and propaganda in practice.33 According to Cunningham, this might be true, however, 
Cunningham emphasizes that Ellul is not saying that the concept of propaganda is the same as the 
concept of information.34 Others, however, see it in a more positive, but maybe naïve light. Jowett 
and O’Donnell for instance see information as a way to reduce uncertainty, and claim that  “people 
                                                             
31 Auerbach & Castronovo eds., The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda, p. 7 
32 Dictionary.com, available at: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/dis- 
33 Cunningham (2002) p. 102 
34 Ibidem. 
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seek information when they need to understand the world.”35 They call this type of information 
informative communication, when it is “used to accomplish a purpose of sharing, explaining, or 
instructing.”36 Ellul, however, claims that “much of the information disseminated nowadays –
research findings, facts, statistics, explanations, analyses- eliminate personal judgement and the 
capacity to form one’s own opinion even more surely than the most extravagant propaganda.”37 So 
according to Ellul, it is this constantly growing quantity of informative communication that in the 
end eliminates the audience’s personal judgement. Jowett and O’Donnell however, state that the 
difference between propaganda and information is “that the purpose exceeds the notion of mutual 
understanding.”38 This statement, however, does not contradict Ellul’s argument, it only introduces 
another variable: purpose, or, intent. According to Ellul, purpose does not matter, instead he points 
to overload: “excessive data do not enlighten the reader or the listener; they drown him.”39 Not 
surprisingly therefore, the Oxford Handbook of Propaganda states that “the relation between 
propaganda and information is fluid, varying according to context and function.”40 This similarity in 
effect and difference in concept will be analysed in further detail below. It is the discrepancy 
between informative communication, deliberate overload, and unintentional overload, however, 
which is the home of disinformation.  
 
 1.4 DEFINING MEANS AND MESSAGE 
As there is practically no extensive academic literature on the subject of disinformation, this section 
will evaluate all mentions of disinformation in academic literature, as well as references to 
otherwise named communication processes that are similar to disinformation. It will then look at 
similarities and differences between the mentions of the authors. This will introduce the criteria 
that will become the pillars of further analysis below. Just to remind the reader: this section will not 
get into the definitions of dezinformatsia, which is often defined by scholars as the only form of 
disinformation. To start the challenging task of describing a relatively underexposed form of 
propaganda, this section will not provide a comprehensive description, but instead form a general 
idea of disinformation. This general idea will then be discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
                                                             
35 Jowett & O’Donnell (2006) p. 30 
36 Ibidem, p. 44 
37 J. Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York, 1973) p. 87 
38 Jowett & O’Donnell (2006) p. 44 
39 Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes , p. 87 
40 Auerbach & Castronovo eds. (2013) p. 6 
15 
 
The section above has already shed some light on the idea of disinformation; this 
introduction is in line with the description that Cunningham gives, which will be considered as a 
basis for further analysis.  Cunningham’s description is valuable, as he describes both 
dezinformatsia and disinformation, and has published the most balanced book on propaganda that 
evaluates practically every scholar who has contributed to the propaganda discussion in the past 
century. Cunningham very briefly (not even half a page) discusses disinformation. “Others”, he 
states, “now situate disinformation [in contrast to dezinformatsia] more broadly, as a form of 
nescience.”41 This idea of ‘lack of knowledge’ is indeed what is in line with what this study wants to 
identify as an effect of disinformation. Cunningham further states that “[Disinformation] signalizes if 
not factual falsity, at least the falsity of intent within the propaganda enterprise at the same time as 
it refers to the feature of information exchange.”42 He does not however, further elaborate on this in 
his own words, but refers to the works Postman, Combs, and Nimmo, which he sees as exemplary of 
this new use of the word disinformation. In the descriptions below, the variables mentioned above 
will come back: intent, overload and falsity. 
Postman argues that disinformation “means misleading information – misplaced, 
fragmented, irrelevant, or superficial information- information that creates the illusion of knowing 
something, but in fact leads one away from knowing.”43 Taken in this understanding, it becomes clear 
that disinformation does not necessarily have to be false: true information can be presented in a 
misplaced, fragmented, or irrelevant way, transforming it into disinformation.   
 Also, regarding the matter of intent, Postman is cautious. He states that this does not imply 
that “television news deliberately aims to deprive Americans of a coherent, contextual 
understanding of their world. [But] that when news is packaged as entertainment, that is the 
inevitable result.”44 These explanations by Postman contain several important variables. The 
illusion of knowing implies that even though the audience gets information, it somehow doesn’t 
become informative communication. One of the reasons Postman introduces for this is the need for 
entertainment; important in this sense is that he doesn’t point to a propagandist, but rather to 
developments in news broadcasting that are responsible for the spread of disinformation. Even 
though this excludes deliberateness, the effect in practice is the same, just as Ellul has tried to prove.  
                                                             
41 Cunningham (2002) p. 68 
42 Ibidem, p. 110 
43 N. Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death (New York, 1985) p. 107, emphasis mine 
44 Ibidem, emphasis mine 
16 
 
In a similar fashion, Combs and Nimmo write about what they call the new propaganda of 
palaver.45 In their historical analysis they explicitly make a distinction between old and new 
propaganda, in which they see lightweight talk, unserious and uncommitted babble, as highly 
influential in present day propaganda. They even state that this new propaganda has become the 
dominant form of communication in modern culture.46  In a general sense, propaganda of palaver is 
similar to the disinformation Postman talks about. Combs and Nimmo claim that “prolix, extended, 
ambiguous, confounding discourse that does not inform, evaluate or express –in short, palaver- 
deserves scorn.”47 It is in this same fashion as Postman that Combs and Nimmo do not point to the 
existence of a propagandist, they even state that this disinformation is “a pervasive or sociological 
phenomenon in contemporary society.”48 It is not only scholars who criticize this development. 
Commercialization of the news industry, as they describe it, is mentioned by many others: “The 
perceived dilution of news and information globally, as a result of market-driven television 
journalism and its impact on the public sphere, has become a major concern for critical media 
theorists.”49  
In both these mentions of disinformation deliberateness is not a significant factor, and is in 
fact, absent. Even though commercial incentive might be influential in the process, it is often not 
purposely misleading for political gain. Another scholar, Robert Goodin, however argues from 
another angle. He describes the same practice, which he calls information overload, but from the 
perspective of politics, it can be described as “maniplulatory” politics. He describes this as a final 
strategy in his model of rational ignorance, where, due to the access to and quantity of information 
in their media landscape, citizens can ultimately be overloaded. According to Goodin, “the 
informational base of an individual’s decision can be undermined by providing him with too much 
information,” leading to the public having trouble assimilating it all. It is this characteristic that was 
also quoted from Ellul in the section above. Overloading an audience with information, according to 
Goodin, will make the audience rely upon official interpretations more readily.50 It is this official 
interpretation that then can be introduced to the public by an intentional propagandist. In this way, 
Goodin has connected disinformation to intent and shown how it can be applied to achieve various 
goals. Disinformation in this sense serves the propagandist, as “additional information more 
generally can often simply serve to confuse the issue, undermining our confidence in our 
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judgements about the probability of the various alternatives without actually adding new 
possibilities.”51 This is actually quite similar to a statement by Ellul: “A surfeit of data, far from 
permitting people to make judgements and form opinions, prevents them from doing so and actually 
paralyzes them.”52 
If disinformation is applied deliberately in order to lead an audience away from knowing by 
overloading it with information and diverting away from sensitive or accusatory information, an 
another element that is of importance is the structure and content of the messages distributed. First 
of all, by diverting attention away from unwanted information, messages will often have to omit 
relevant information and replace it with disinformation. It is therefore not necessarily the 
withholding of information, but rather the selective use of information that becomes relevant. 
Strictly withholding information makes the position of the propagandist actually more vulnerable 
for criticism. As Postman noted above, the entertainment factor of a message is also important—a 
message has to be attractive to the audience. In addition, rhetorical tricks can be of importance in 
order to downplay certain information or to mislead an audience within a certain message. 
Entertainment and relevance are therefore important. This will be elaborated upon in the following 
sections. 
What this study argues, is that the basis of disinformation is highly selective, and consists of 
mostly factual information that is on some degree dispensed with the intent that it will spread in 
large quantities and lead the populace away from knowing, and eventually, uninterested in getting a 
comprehensive oversight or accept a framework presented by the authorities. By having placed the 
need to mislead as a function of the message above the need to inform, fact and opinion are often 
merged with the result of high entertainment value, whether this is fear or other emotions. Every 
degree between palaver and disinformation can be considered to exist at some point on the scale of 
disinformation. The criteria that will be evaluated below are therefore: intent, control, quantity, 
message, emotion, and falsity. 
 
1.5 CRITERIA 
Having established an idea of disinformation based on the relatively few mentions of it in academic 
literature, this section will focus on the matter from means to message. The criteria that will be 
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analysed derive from the discussions mentioned above. By concentrating on specific elements more 
literature becomes available to identify and discuss these criteria. The subjects of criteria are:  
1) the need for intention, or deliberateness, of disinformation and how this is controlled;  
2) the quantity of messages that is needed for disinformation to be effective and how this can be 
achieved; 3) the content of disinformation messages: in what way do rhetoric fallacies play a role 
and what are similarities in these messages, how important is narrative if advocating ideology is not 
an element of disinformation?; 4) emotion, if disinformation is so much about message or narrative, 
then what role does emotion play in these messages?; 5) falsity, to what extend do messages need to 
be false, as many descriptions mention. 
 
INTENT & CONTROL 
As shown above, there is no clear academic answer to the necessity of deliberateness in propaganda, 
as well as in disinformation. Even when deliberateness is a factor in disinformation, it should be 
measured on a scale instead of a sharp boundary. This section will further analyse the need for 
intent in disinformation, and elaborate on how to define and prove intent. Another important 
element discussed here is the idea of a goal behind deliberate disinformation. 
 As shown in the descriptions by Postman and Combs and Nimmo, their descriptions of 
disinformation exclude the necessity of intent. Instead, these scholars see disinformation as a 
sociological phenomenon caused by public desire or as a result of commercial incentives. This study 
argues that deliberateness is therefore not a necessity, as the effect of unintentional disinformation 
is in practice the same: it leads away from knowing. The division between deliberate and accidental 
is nonetheless still very important, because when disinformation is created and distributed by a 
propagandist with political or commercial gain, it can achieve certain goals as was described by 
Goodin. Control of the information flow in this sense makes it easier to shift attention away from 
undesired information. However, as Jowett and O’Donnell, as well as many others rightly observe: 
“the expansion of access to information around the world through new mass communication 
technologies has made control of information flow difficult.” 53  Contradictorily, this is not 
disadvantageous for disinformation. On the contrary, it has become much technologically easier to 
distribute an even larger quantity of messages. 
This division between deliberate and unintentional is not a clear line, but is instead a scale 
from intentional disinformation to palaver for other (commercial) purposes. This deliberateness can 
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be a result of self-initiative. In this way, intent does not have to mean a deliberate attempt by one 
propagandist, but rather a sympathiser.54 Also, unintentional disinformation can unwittingly be 
supportive of deliberate disinformation if the unintentional palaver is reproducing disinformation. 
For this study, the presence of some form of intent is necessary. We must assume that the 
disinformation in Russian media is at least to some extent deliberate in order to conclude that there 
is in fact disinformation, and not a media environment which has become victim to commercial 
infotainment.  The question of self-censorship remains, and accordingly of initiative by reporters to 
produce disinformation as a habit rather than as a result of instruction by a main propagandist. This 
idea is also stated by Auerbach: “people can actively use propaganda and are not simply passive 
dupes used by it. Propaganda does not necessarily spread from the top down.”55 Therefore, more 
information on the control and structure of the media landscape is needed. If intent is highly 
suspected, it should be visible in the structure of media ownership and control over the information 
flow within a specific region. For this reason Auerbach also emphasizes that “analysing propaganda 
requires paying as much attention to networks of information flow (how) as the content (what).”56 
Others recommend focussing on commonalities in disinformation. Jowett and O’Donnell for instance 
suggest searching for the person or organization who has most to gain from disseminating 
disinformation.57 Doob offers another way, and suggests looking for what he calls verbal 
compulsions: “look for the person who speaks frequently and with authority.”58 
 
QUANTITY 
If disinformation is indeed intentional, for it to have any effect the quantity of messages is of great 
importance, as was also described by Ellul and Combs and Nimmo earlier in this chapter. In order to 
overload citizens with disinformation, the quantity of messages is essential. According to Goebbels, 
a malign expert in propaganda practice, “propaganda must be simple and repetitive.”59 In contrast 
to the propaganda of the Third Reich however, disinformation does not necessarily have to be 
repetitive because it in essence does not try to activate ideology, as mentioned above. It is extremely 
important to realize that in disinformation the need for quantity of differentiating views exceeds the 
need for narrative. Quantity will achieve the desired effect that Ellul has comprehensively described: 
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“[The Reader] cannot remember [all data], or coordinate them, or understand them; if he does not 
want to risk loosing his mind, he will merely draw a general picture from them. And the more facts 
supplied, the more simplistic the image.”60 Goodin also explains this in his description of the need 
for consistency in a politician’s narrative for it to stick with the masses. Turning this idea around 
shows the power of a quantity of differentiating stories: “if a politician or a party offers a different 
framework for interpreting every event, then none of them will stick.”61   
The new technologies of the present have made the distribution of information and 
disinformation relatively easy. Where Lee observed in 1939 that there had never been “so much 
propaganda so powerfully implemented now we have radio and newspapers”62, technological 
development has only created more possibilities for communication. Not without reason did Jowett 
and O’Donnell see the 21st century as “global society bombarded with information.”63 Where 
propaganda aimed at foreign countries was difficult to distribute in the 20th century, with the 
coming of Internet and the digitalization of the media, this this process has become childishly easy. 
 
MESSAGE & EMOTION 
Even though quantity might be more important than the content of the message, without messages 
there simply can be no disinformation. Within the message two elements are of importance: 
language and emotion. That it is not about the message, but about function, does not mean that the 
content of the message is unimportant. These messages have to lead away from knowing, as was 
established above as one of the main characteristics of disinformation. To construct an idea about 
this, literature on propaganda structure will be used that describes several rhetoric techniques and 
fallacies which can create the desired effect. Emotion is another important factor within the 
message, because in the end the emotion needs to remain while the message content serves only a 
temporary purpose as it fades away into the overload of messages. As will become clear below, the 
importance of emotions resonates in every sub criteria—it is practically impossible to discuss 
rhetoric or fallacies without naming a relation to emotion. There are several ways to create such 
artificial credibility in messages:  theme, rhetoric, public agents, entertainment, conspiracies and 
emotion.  
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It is important for the messages to adhere to an actual theme. Messages must adhere to a certain 
sense of truth potentiality in order to be accepted by the audience.64 In some cases, this means that 
messages have to fit into the propagated reality instead of what an outsider would see as reality. 
This is where there is an interaction between disinformation and other forms of propaganda that 
activate ideologies. The messages have to fit into the ideologies that the media have made popular.  
A second important factor is the use of rhetoric to create the propagandist’s desired effect. As 
Cunningham describes, “[propaganda] does not use language as a vehicle of thought with a 
connection to the real world, but rather reduces it to the status of a tool to generate feeling and 
mere reflexes, or lead us to meaninglessness.”65 This is also what the early 20th century propaganda 
researchers tried to identify. It is in this form of propaganda that some of the techniques described 
by, for instance, Alfred Lee, can come in useful as descriptors of language use in disinformation. 
Whether they are intentionally used or not, the fallacies he describes can form the basis of the 
message which may be factual, but at the same time make the argument misleading. Since there 
should not be an intention to promote a single narrative, or activate ideology, the methods 
described below are used to create an artificial emotional connection or artificial credibility. 
Name-calling is how Lee describes one of his seven ‘tricks of the trade’. Name-calling is a 
trick where an omnibus word, “words that mean different things and have different emotional 
overtones for different people”, are used to describe persons, groups, ideas or any form of event etc. 
by giving it a bad name. It thereby “makes us reject and condemn the idea without examining the 
evidence.”66 Name-calling is the opposite of the technique that Lee calls ‘glittering generality’, which 
involves associating something with a ‘virtue word’ that resonates with deep-set ideas like 
‘democracy’ or ‘patriotism’. According to Lee, these virtue words are used to “make us accept and 
approve the thing without examining the evidence.”67 For exactly these reasons, virtue words and 
omnibus words can be important tools, not only because they generate an emotional response, but 
also because they can be used to create emotionally appealing messages without the need for 
substance. The use of these words can be improved for disinformation by staying deliberately vague, 
as shown by Marvin Williams, doctor of Philosophy: “According to this strategy the speaker clearly 
addresses those issues which he feels are acceptable to the audience and equivocates those issues 
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with which they disagree.”68 Staying vague while creating an emotional response can create an 
endless stream of reactions that produce a favorable environment for disinformation. This should 
not have to be a necessity however, as disinformation could just as easily be clear in its message, 
provided there is a sufficient quantity of divergent messages. 
Another important argumentative fallacy is what Lee calls testimonial: “having some 
respected or hated person say that a given idea or program or product or person is good or bad.”69 
This can be used to create arguments or even complete stories out of thin air. It can be used to quote 
from other sources or persons, when actually the message itself does not have any weight. In 
addition, it is also a way for the deliberate propagandist to distance himself from potential recoil 
from risky messages, because these messages are only quoted from someone else. For 
disinformation, moreover, the quoted person does not even have to be respected or hated; it could 
practically be anyone that would voice his opinion, as long as it contributes to the quantity of 
messages. 
In a similar fashion argumentation can construct, or build upon, conspiracy theories. Conspiracy 
theories always lead away from knowing, because they are essentially self-sealing prophecies.70 The 
external elements that create an atmosphere that is susceptible to conspiracy theories are when, 
according to Zarefsky, an expert on political argumentation, “they explain an otherwise ambiguous 
evil… when they explain a pattern of anomalies… when polarizing positions helps to resolve 
ambiguity… [or] at times of social strain.”71 In an environment with disinformation allows 
conspiracy theories to potentially become even more accepted, as Zarefsky claims that “the general 
appeal of a conspiracy argument derives from its ability to explain paradox and incongruity.”72 And 
it is especially in such an environment that paradox and incongruity between propaganda and day-
to-day life occur most.  
As described above, emotion is more important than content in disinformation. Not only for its 
initial attraction value, but also to create an overall feeling, and as an addictive element to assure the 
prevalence of disinformation over alternative informative communication. It is not the quantity of 
narratives that will be remembered, but the overall feeling of emotion. As is common in propaganda, 
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since it often serves to simplify and therefore strengthen its persuasive power, is the feeling of 
knowing who is good and who is evil.73 
Overall, emotion is an important factor in propaganda. As Cunningham already described 
above, language is mainly there as “a tool to generate feeling and mere reflexes, or lead us to 
meaninglessness.”74 Of the range of emotions, Thomson points to fear as being the most exploited by 
propaganda, “with the ability to spin dangers almost out of thin air – the torments of hell, devils, 
Napoleons in the cupboard, witches, phantom armies, and millennial cataclysms, all dressed up and 
given fearsome attributes.”75 However, fear is not the only emotion needed, as Stanley states: “To be 
effective propaganda must harness a rich affective range beyond negative emotions such as hatred, 
fear, and envy to include more positive feelings such as pleasure, joy belonging, and pride.”76 In the 
same sense, the argumentative tricks described above are used to elicit these emotional responses. 
 
Last but not least, for retaining credibility, occasional self-criticism would serve the propagandist in 
order to prove that “all” perspectives are treated alike. This also confuses the sharp-eyed or more 
critical audience. For this reason, negative information about the propagandist country is 
sometimes also published by propaganda vehicles, in order to give the other messages more 
credibility.77  
 
FALSITY 
As mentioned before in this chapter, and as becomes clear from the discussions on propaganda and 
disinformation, there is no necessity for falsity in disinformation. Using rhetorical techniques to 
bend reality and omitting important information is also effective. Selective use of truth is the best 
method for the propagandist. Cunningham emphasizes this as well, stating,  “it is widely recognized 
among the practitioners themselves that the success of disinformation campaigns is proportional to 
the degree in which correct information is communicated.”78 While lying might just as easily occur, it 
not a necessity for propaganda. It is often more convenient for a propagandist to distance himself 
from lies by using testimonial as a technique and consequently offer an interpretive framework, 
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because, as Goodin states, “someone found advancing an ill-fitting interpretive framework might be 
thought a fool, but he probably will not be called a liar.”79 
 
1.6 DEZINFORMATSIA 
In what way then, after constructing this more detailed idea of disinformation does it differ from 
dezinformatsia? The term dezinformatsia was used in the Soviet Union first to describe what later 
would be called active measures.80  Active measures is a soviet term that describes overt and covert 
techniques aimed at “influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its 
leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and 
weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents.”81 Cunningham describes it as a term 
“to denote contrived news accounts or reports that have been planted in the news systems of 
adversary nations, and that are designed to weaken and destabilize the latter.”82 Most authors seem 
to agree on these basics of dezinformatsia, as do Shultz and Godson, experts on dezinformatsia: “The 
objective of [dezinformatsia] is to manipulate target persons and groups to believe in the veracity of 
the message and consequently to act in the interests of the nation conducting the operation.”83 
Dezinformatsia is also explicitly described in KGB reports: “strategic disinformation assists in the 
execution of state tasks and is directed at misleading the enemy concerning basic questions of state 
policy, the military-economic status, and the scientific-technical achievements of the Soviet Union”84. 
Even though the Soviets had become quite well organized in distributing dezinformatsia, they surely 
were not the only ones, as Jowett and O’Donnell also have observed that “[dezinformatsia] is no less 
widely practiced by most of the major world powers.”85  
What comes forward from these descriptions is that the main idea behind dezinformatsia is 
different from what this study describes as disinformation. Its main element is secrecy through 
deflecting the real source of the information, and above all, it is only aimed at foreign audiences. 
That is certainly different from disinformation that is based on the technique of misleading through 
overload. It is some ways similar, in that both phenomena try to mislead, but in essence these 
phenomena are not the same. This is not to say however, that these sort of active measures are not 
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around anymore. Among other instances, the short war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 and the 
Crimea military campaign seem to have been supported through these Soviet-style active 
measures.86 
CONCLUSION 
One of the most important elements in describing propaganda is the fluidity of boundaries. As 
scholars have been arguing for over a century on the definition of propaganda it has become clear 
that there are no strict divisions and the phenomenon itself is far too multifarious to fit into a sharp 
definition. Even though much literature has been dedicated to describing propaganda, literature on 
disinformation as a form of propaganda is hard to find. The characteristics of disinformation are 
therefore created from a composition of references to disinformation or phenomena that resemble 
the same characteristics. 
From this combination of data this chapter concludes that there are several important 
elements that describe disinformation in general. Disinformation leads away from knowing, as a 
form of nescience, by either overloading the public with (superfluous or misleading) information or 
rendering it numb through an abundance of nonsensical infotainment, or palaver. In concept 
overloading can be intentional, while entertaining is more described as a sociological phenomenon. 
In both instances however, they lead away from knowing, thus the effect is the same. 
It are exactly these different variable characteristics that can distinctively transform this 
idea of disinformation. These characteristics are: the difference between the deliberate attempt at 
deploying disinformation as a tactic to distract, or the presence of an unintentional sociological 
phenomenon that lets a society generate its own disinformation, and everything in between; the 
quantity of messages and differentiating narratives for disinformation to have an effect; the 
rhetorical fallacies used to generate emotional response, like the use of virtue words and omnibus 
words, and the use of testimonial to create an argument; and the use of lies and truth or the creation 
of a framework for interpretation that is less vulnerable for criticism. 
The main element that is absent in disinformation, the characteristic that most importantly 
differentiates disinformation from other forms of propaganda, is the idea of activating ideology. 
Above all, the distinction between disinformation and dezinformatsia should be clear, they should 
not be regarded as similar phenomena. 
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CHAPTER II DISINFORMATION IN RUSSIA 
Now this study has established  the boundaries of disinformation in the first chapter, the question 
now is to what extent this practice is common in the Russian state-media. Even though there has 
been decade-long criticism of the freedom of the Russian press, the Russian state-media have caught 
renewed international attention after their coverage of events and developments in the protests 
against former president Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine and has grown even more since the 
geopolitical turmoil that followed. This chapter will review secondary literature on the analyses of 
the Russian state-media and thereby identify the presence of disinformation in Russia’s main 
national media. After the indicatory presence of disinformation, a more detailed analysis following 
the criteria from the first chapter will follow. This study thereby excludes Russian international 
media for, even though they might make perfect examples of the use of disinformation in a 
competitive environment, these media and accompanying tactics and organization would require a 
separate analysis. The narrowing down on the Russian media coverage also brought up a 
differentiation within the established description of disinformation, for it turned out to be 
complicated to classify all disinformation without sliding into other forms of propaganda, therefore 
a distinction will be described between pro-active disinformation and reactive disinformation. Both 
of these terms, however, can vary on a scale sliding down to  disinformative palaver. Nonetheless, 
first of all a short introduction on the Russian media landscape, the framework of analysis, and the 
literature used is required. 
 
2.1 LITERATURE ON DISINFORMATION 
Just as encountered in the first chapter, there seems to be a shortfall of academic literature on 
disinformation in present-day Russia. And not even just disinformation, but propaganda in general 
seems to be an unattended subject in Russian Studies. As also mentioned above, there is academic 
literature on active measures, or dezinformatsia, however, even though there are similarities in the 
descriptions between the two forms, as in all subdivisions of propaganda, it is also too explicitly 
different on a multiple of aspects that this literature is of little use.87 However, where there is a lack 
of academic literature, there is an abundance of popular literature on the subject, due to popular 
international attention for Russia’s propaganda activities. Some of these articles and papers 
mention the term disinformation to describe the activities of Russian state-media in Russia and 
abroad. In these articles, however, it is not always clear as to why they choose to use the term 
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disinformation, also occasionally described as misinformation. The articles and papers this chapter 
will evaluate are among the most referred to and credible sources to be found publicly on the 
subject of propaganda in present-day Russia. These include articles and papers by think tanks, 
international organizations and political magazines. Think tanks that published substantively on the 
subject are The Institute of Modern Russia, the Central European Policy Institute and the Warshaw 
Centre for Eastern Studies. Public policy papers have been published by NATO Stratfor, on Russia 
and information warfare, and a monitoring report supported by several EU organizations. The 
political magazines that have provided views on Russian disinformation are The Economist, Foreign 
Affairs, the Interpreter and Time. Most of these publications, however, focus on implications for 
Russia’s near abroad as a victim of information warfare.88 The most extensive documentation up to 
date is the paper by television producer and writer Peter Pomerantsev and journalist Michael Weiss 
for the Institute of Modern Russia dealing with what they call the weaponization of information. 
Another important author is journalist and media-owner Vasily Gatov, who has published multiple 
articles in the past months on the Russian media, where he used to be part of himself. 
What these publications have in common is that they signal a form of propaganda from 
Russia, and consequent ways of implementation, that the authors see as threat to the established, 
democratic press and has potential devastating effects on easily influenced target groups. The 
publications mention a range of terms varying from ‘information warfare’ to ‘new propaganda’ to 
‘disinformation’ and ‘misinformation’, however, as it is inappropriate in these types of publications 
to elaborate and justify extensively on their terminology, most of these publications lack a 
comprehensive description of this type of propaganda this study is about. In other words, these 
publications combined come close to situating the use of disinformation as described in the first 
chapter in Russia but are not unified in their terminology. Even though these publicists often speak 
of disinformation it is never evidently clear what the boundaries of disinformation are, how they 
have interpreted the term and where they found a usable definition. 
As the above mentioned literature will mainly serve as a mainframe to show how these 
authors think about the presence of disinformation in Russia by establishing the similarities 
between the criteria from the first chapter and the observation form the literature on Russia. These 
sources, however, do not provide enough in-depth analysis for a comprehensive evaluation of 
disinformation applied. Other sources for this chapter therefore include academic sources on 
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Russia’s media landscape, mainly by an extensive analysis by Anna Arutunyan, a Moscow based 
journalism expert. Another publication that is of value is a recent publication by the Journal of 
Soviet and post-Soviet Studies, that published a special on Russian media and the war in Ukraine. 
For more in-depth analysis per criteria there are specific academic articles, that even though not 
specifically on propaganda or disinformation, deal with specific criteria discussed above 
implemented on the Russian media, like for instance the prevalence conspiracy theories in Russia. 
Because of a growing insecurity about the negative influence of Russian international 
channels, aimed at targeting former Soviet-states and the West, much focus in on international 
effects and consequences, however, this study will only use the information necessary for an 
analysis of the national use of disinformation.  
2.2 MEDIA LANDSCAPE 
Some introduction on the characteristics of the Russian media is needed for understanding in what 
environment this analysis takes place. This overview will be short to generate just an idea of the 
landscape and not to explain it in extreme detail, for that would take up to much space. The focus 
within this study is on the main national media, which is on a large scale owned by the state or 
otherwise by holdings connected to the state through companies with close ties to the Kremlin, like 
Gazprom Media or National Media Group.89 Within the Russian media landscape television has 
shown to be the most popular and influential medium.90 Polling suggests that there is an evident top 
three in popularity of channels: the most watched television channels are First Channel, Rossia 1 
and NTV, which attract practically over two-thirds of the total viewers. The respondents show a 
clear preference for television as their main medium for news about Russia and the world.91 Even 
though research shows that the amount of news time devoted to domestic politics has seen a 
decline.92 The second most popular medium for news gathering is, according to the respondents, 
news acquired from friends, family and neighbours, as well as from internet. Internet in Russia, even 
though gaining popularity, is often not used for obtaining news but rather for looking up 
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information or for entertainment.93 Newspapers have seen a decline in the recent decade, but of 
course play a role on the internet too as portals for news messages.  
In addition to a strong grip on the media through ownership, the Kremlin also exters power through 
legislation. One of the first decrees signed by Putin was the Information Security Doctrine in 2000, 
in which “freedom of information was subordinated to the needs of national security and the 
preservation of Russian moral values.”94 Following the turmoil after Putin’s re-election in  2012 
more limiting laws have been adopted. One of the most recent ones being the law that prohibits 
foreign ownership of Russian media.95 
The only mainstream editorially independent national media are formed by a small group of 
outlets that gather combined only a marginal amount of audience.96 Among some others this group 
consists mainly of TV Dozhd, Echo Moskvy, Novaya Gazeta and RBK. 
 
2.3 PRECENCE OF DISINFORMATION 
By evaluating the literature mentioned above, this section tries to show the presence of 
disinformation as explained in detail in the first chapter. It will establish a first sense of the 
observations of the authors that have published about disinformation that is present in the media 
landscape mentioned above. Even though some articles literally spell it out, it is not that easy to 
form a solid argument based on these articles. The following quote is exemplary for this dilemma: 
“The Russian Federation uses extensive propaganda, outright lies, and—most importantly—
disinformation as part of the hybrid warfare it is waging against Ukraine and the West.”97 This quote 
by Paul Goble, an American Russia analyst, is exemplary for several reasons. At first glance it should 
serve as a contribution to the argument this chapter tries to prove: it argues that there are multiple 
forms of propaganda produced by the Russian government, that one of those forms of propaganda is 
disinformation, which is different than outright lies. As it turns out, however, like many other 
authors, and already described above, the disinformation Goble describes is dezinformatsia. He 
thereby refers to a book by Natalie Grant, an expert in revealing Soviet deception methods, 
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published in 1960. Moreover, not only is it not about this study’s idea of disinformation, Goble is not 
the most objective source as his career includes functions at the State Department, CIA, Voice of 
America and Radio Free Europe/Radio liberty. It is no guarantee of partiality, but these functions 
show that he is prepared to publically defend and even propagandize the West, as he mentions in his 
quote. It is exactly these types of articles that this study is cautious about, even though they seem 
relevant. Therefore this quote is of no use at all. Instead this section has to focus on the small 
amount of publications that distinguish between dezinformatsia and disinformation. 
As mentioned above, Weiss and Pomerantsev, have most extensively tried to establish a 
common description for what they call disinformation that is many ways is less suggestive in their 
approach. In ‘The Menace of Unreality’, they give in a general sense an idea of what they see as 
disinformation in Russia. They argue that: “the aim of this new propaganda is not to convince or 
persuade, but to keep the viewer hooked and distracted, passive and paranoid, rather than agitated 
to action.”98 In contrast to Goble, Weiss and Pomerantsev clearly distinguish between old and new 
propaganda and in this sense distance themselves from dezinformatsia by calling this 
disinformation new propaganda. This argument seems to be in line with what this study described 
in the first chapter, it follows Combs and Nimmo’s description of the propaganda of palaver. Also 
their emphasis on keeping the viewer distracted rather than agitated to action is exactly what 
differentiates disinformation from other forms of propaganda that activate ideology. As becomes 
clear from the beginning of the statement, Pomerantsev and Weiss clearly see in this disinformation 
the work of a propagandist, the Kremlin, for this disinformation is applied with an aim.  
How this is done, they state, is by marginalizing the idea of truth: “no one even tries proving the 
‘truth’. You can just say anything. Create realities.”99 According to them, “the kremlin’s power is 
entrenched not by trying to persuade people that it is telling the truth, but by making it clear that it 
can dictate the terms of the “truth” and thus enhancing its aura of power. Information, and 
television in particular, is key in this society of pure spectacle” 100 That resonates Postman’s 
emphasis on entertainment as a cause of disinformation, as well as the creation of conspiracy 
theories to create ‘truths’. One of the reasons that this is possible is through manipulation of 
language, the use of rhetoric fallacies as described by Lee: “the point of ideas and language are not 
what they represent, but what function they fulfill. The point of any statement is its effect rather 
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than any notion of truth.”101 It is this combination of elements that according to Weiss and 
Pomerantsev has led to the point that “the border between fact and fiction has become utterly 
blurred in Russian media and public discourse.”102  
These general features are at sometimes also combined in specific instances. It is in a similar fashion 
that the guardian explained disinformation after the murder of Nemtsov in an editorial as “the idea 
that there are multiple interpretations of the truth has become the founding philosophy of state 
disinformation [in Russia].”103 Weiss and Pomerantsev, however, do not link their description 
directly to a disinformation campaign in Russia, they do however point to the coverage of English-
language Russian TV-channel RT, “RT spread conspiracy theories regarding the cause ranging from 
the flight being shot down by Ukrainian forces aiming at Putin’s personal plane to Ukrainian 
deployment of Buk SAMs in the area.”104 
These descriptions of disinformation are to a large extent the same as mentioned in the 
chapter above. Weiss and Pomerantsev are not alone in this idea of the Russian state-media carrying 
out disinformation. A range of publications endorses these views. For instance the more general 
problems of the Russian media are discussed by many, for instance in a report funded by the EU:  
“the media monitoring report revealed that [First Channel, Rossiya 1 and NTV] in their evening 
newscasts demonstrated a lack of balance, distorted, biased and incomplete information. The most 
alarming finding was the consistent practice of neglecting to air opposing views in numerous news 
stories. In fact, such approach appeared to be a usual part, the of the Russian state-controlled 
broadcasters.”105 They continue to observe that “beside frequent news reports that lacked the 
balance, the stories were quite often distorted and twisted into a different meaning, supported by 
selective use of sources or facts. Moreover, such approach contained subjective and partisan 
evaluations and assessments from the journalists, making it almost impossible for viewers to 
distinguish between facts and commentaries.”106 
  This mixture of fact and fiction seem to be best presented by one of Russia’s main television 
hosts: Dimitry Kiselev, an anchor on the Rossiya channel and head of news agency Rossiya Segodnya, 
watching his show, claims Joshua Yaffa, a Moscow based journalist for The Economist, “leaves the 
viewer with the exhausting impression that no one is objective, everyone is compromised, and 
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anyone who attempts to make sense of what is happening in Russia and the world must be serving 
one side or another.”107 Another element is described by Ben Nimmo, former NATO press officer and 
freelance writer and propaganda analyst. He emphasizes the vagueness in Russian propaganda.  
Among four other tactics he describes to the techniques of Russian present-day propaganda he sees 
distraction as an important tactic: “Sometimes the distraction serves to create doubt and confusion, 
as in the case of the MH-17 disaster, which has become a source of burgeoning conspiracy 
theories.”108 Nimmo continues that “the techniques of distraction create uncertainty, confusion, and 
ultimately a doubt whether any source can be trusted without detailed personal experience. It 
generates a moral quagmire in which everyone is wrong, and therefore wrong actions become 
normal.”109 The most comprehensive and corresponding comes from the Atlantic Counsel: “The 
Kremlin's disinformation campaign goes far beyond controlling its own media. It is aimed at nothing 
less than presenting a parallel version of reality and disseminating it as if it were news. The 
Kremlin's goal is to make people question the value of media at all; to reject the idea of an absolute 
truth; and to persuade the public that "reality" is relative.”110 
These overall descriptions of disinformation used in Russian media have many elements in 
common with what this study presented in the first chapter. However, as the disinformation 
campaign surrounding the downing of MH17 has been mentioned, it is these instances that a 
specific campaign is launched to minimize the damage of factual information. As mentioned above, 
this study wants to argue that these instances lead to another form of disinformation than the 
general mentions above. It is exactly this difference that this study wants to highlight, for the 
deliberateness is in those instances is more prevalent. This study will refer to this form as reactive 
disinformation. The example of reactive disinformation is also described during a Chatham House 
session: “Several examples illustrate the power of [information war]. First, after MH17 was shot 
down, the Russian media churned out dozens of versions of possible events. This included the story 
that MH17 had been shot down accidentally by Ukrainian forces aiming at Putin’s plane. This was 
not done out of ignorance, but was instead a cynical exercise in confusion that aimed to distort the 
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media space and introduce uncertainty into the Western narrative.”111 It is this deliberateness of 
distorting the media coverage of these important events that is also described by the Guardian: “the 
idea that there are multiple interpretations of the truth has become the founding philosophy of state 
disinformation in Putin’s Russia, designed to confuse those who would seek out the truth with 
multiple expressions of distracting PR chaff. The tactic is to create as many competing narratives as 
possible. And, amid all the resultant hermeneutic chaos, to quietly slip away undetected.”112 
These description of disinformation in Russia, most of which written by Western journalists, 
however, still make up only meagre proof of the presence of disinformation. Interestingly however, 
elements of organized attempts to distribute disinformation or specific words or phrases can often 
be proved by open source information analysis. Not only do traceable bot-networks spread 
disinformation at specified times, also can companies that claim to be independent local news 
organizations actually be traced back to one several similar Google Analytics accounts, that way 
establishing a digital trace that links all these “independent” websites back to one person.113 
Other than disinformation, the Russian media are also often ascribed other forms of 
propaganda as well. As an example is late Nemtsov’s daughter who describes a form of propaganda 
that resembles more the idea of hate propaganda, as mentioned by Cunningham in the first chapter: 
“The issue is not just the bad-faith work of some media. The Putin information machine, like the 
Nazi and Rwanda machines, uses criminal methods of propaganda, sows hatred, which causes 
violence and terror. The main method is the dehumanization of the group attacked. Russia 
opposition members are portrayed in Putin's media as "alien" on the analogy of monsters from a 
warrior with the same name.”114 
The mentions of disinformation by the authors in this section serve to create an average idea 
of the presence of disinformation in Russia’s state-media. As a starting point for a more detailed 
evaluation of the characteristics of disinformation, the sections below will analyse these elements in 
more detail and address more academic literature in the process. That way a more coherent image 
of disinformation in Russia can be supplied. 
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INTENT & CONTROL 
As the rhetoric of the authors above already illustrates the main idea is that disinformation in 
Russia is deliberate and controlled by the state. There is also an abundance of literature on the 
Russian media repressions under Putin. As mentioned above, recent legislature is also in line with 
an on-going crackdown on freedom of media in Russia. Freedom House reported in 2012 that “the 
state owns, either directly or through proxies, all six national television networks, two national 
radio networks, two of the 14 national newspapers, more than 6 per cent of the roughly 40.000 local 
newspapers and periodicals, and two national news agencies.”115 As Arutunyan points out, although 
she is careful of linking ownership directly to state sanctioned censorship, that the government, as 
many other media corporations, “dictate to an extent, the content of the media it owns”116 Direct 
influence is according to multiple sources applied by the use of direct telephone contact between 
heads of media organizations and the Kremlin through a ”media hotline”, created in the mid-2000s 
which created a “system of direct communication between Kremlin “handlers” and chief editors at 
state controlled media.”117 This government interference in the media is also verified by former 
Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Zverev: “political meetings where we 
discussed the agenda of the coming week and developed proposals on how to cover those topics in 
the media, primarily television.”118 These arguments would imply that the state is in direct control 
over the dissemination of disinformation. Applying Doob’s verbal compulsions theory would also 
clearly point to the Kremlin as controller of the media, for “the president and government 
dominated the news, taking up some 93 per cent of airspace.”119.  
There are, however, also other theories on state control in Russia.  Robert Orttung and 
Christopher Walker, for instance, claim that “over the course of the Putin era widespread self-
censorship has grown deep roots at news organizations.”120 It is also according to Arutunyan that 
this self-censorship is one of the stronger mechanisms of control. She quotes a journalist that said 
he never had experienced government pressure, but the more so from his bosses “who would 
always try to run in front of the government train.”121 She sees this as a “deeply embedded” legacy 
from the Soviet Union, where, even though there was an official censor, it was the politically 
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appointed editor that decided how far a story could go. “Editors sometimes urge reporters to ‘sense’ 
what is expected ‘from above’”, without any clear orders.122 It is in this sense that the only political 
control over the media are reprimands after the fact, as a future guideline for “the sense” of 
reporters. 123 
Elizabeth Schimpfossl and Ilya Yablokov, who have written an article on Russian censorship 
in the 2010’s, go even further to argue that “media governance in contemporary Russia does not 
need to resort to coercive methods, or the exertion of self-censorship among its staff, to support 
government views.”124 Actually, they state, it is “quite the contrary: reporters enjoy relatively large 
leeway to develop their creativity, which is crucial for state-aligned television networks to keep 
audience ratings up. Those pundits, anchors and reporters who are involved in the direct promotion 
of Kremlin positions usually have consciously and deliberately chosen to do so.”125 Vasily Gatov also 
emphasizes this theory: “the primary characteristic of the new censorship is that it motivates so-
called “journalists” to not only serve the Kremlin agenda, but to creatively advance it.”126 This self-
initiative, however, also can lead to overenthusiastic coverage of events. An example is for instance 
the crucified child in Ukraine, for which the First Channel eventually had to make a public 
apology.127  
However, some sort of coordination should still be present to coordinate reactive 
disinformation campaigns. This is also stated by a NATO report: “ Because of the synchronous 
execution of messaging on different media channels, it can be assumed that the news reports were 
prepared by political technologists”128 This study will argue that it is actually a hybrid control from 
the top. This means that incentives come from public figures who are tied to the government and 
regarded influential, but that the actual production of disinformation is up to the editors and 
reporters to produce on their own initiative. If a medium starts to divert from the Kremlin-line the 
government has all the power over the media landscape it needs to marginalize or dismantle the 
medium. This hybrid process will become more clear in the next chapter. 
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QUANTITY 
By owning or controlling most of the national media it is easier for the government to sustain the 
environment wherein disinformation can flow. It would, however, require a quantitative analysis of 
the Russian media to be able to make a valid argument. Another way in which the aim for quantity 
can be proven is by the analysis of open source information on websites and twitter-bots. Multiple 
open source researches have established connections between pro-Kremlin websites that 
distributed information that was misleading. As for instance the website emaidan.com.ua, which 
“appears at first glance to be a legitimate information resource for the Ukrainian protest movement. 
But closer inspection shows it is laced with rising anti-Ukrainian sentiment, as if written by a 
disillusioned former Maidan supporter.”129 
 
MESSAGE & EMOTION 
As described in the first chapter, the function of the message is more important than its content. 
This is also described by Weiss and Pomerantsev: “the point of ideas and language are not what they 
represent, but what function they fulfil. The point of any statement is its effect rather than any 
notion of truth.”130 Even though, the function of the message should still be analysed. As regards the 
content of the messages there are several elements that the authors describe: the mixing of facts 
with opinion, the high degree of entertainment, the use of conspiracy theories, the use of rhetorical 
fallacies and the use of public agents to shape the messages. 
According to Daya Thussu, professor in International Communication and author on a book 
on the rise of global infotainment “one of the most notable signs of the globalization of infotainment 
is to be found in the former communist countries.”131 Russia is in this sense no exception. Tina 
Burrett, Political scientist and specialist on Russian television, explains this by pointing at the need 
for Russian news executives to entertain their audience for market share: “In order to keep 
audiences happy in a rapidly expanding and increasingly competitive marketplace, television news 
in Russia became part of the entertainment industry. … Russian news executives are often more 
concerned with entertaining the public than serving their informational needs”132 The monitoring 
report commissioned by the EU emphasizes a same conclusion: “Presenters and journalists of news 
programmes … mixed facts with their own opinions and attitudes, including their feelings and 
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position on a subject or topic or often gave their own assessment of facts and events.”133 Burrett, 
however, also mentions another possible reason for the significant presence of the Russian 
infotainment culture. She states that “some commentators suggest that more sinister motives lie 
behind the development of an infotainment culture in Russian news. … owing to the political 
expediency of Russia’s power holders … entertainment news is used to numb its hapless recipients 
and render them oblivious to the insufferable drudgery of their dreary, crime-infested, corruption-
laden and, in general, rather doomed lives … using low-calorie news to distract public attention 
from government failures and misdemeanours.”134  
On the matter of word use, an analysis of the buzzwords used by Dimitry Kiselev in his 
weekly news show Vesti Nedeli shows a pattern of buzzwords that create an immediate response in 
internet searches. They are often emotionally laden words that resonate WWII or anti-Americanism, 
like ‘fascists’ or ‘Russophobes’.135 These words resemble the omnibus words and virtue words 
described by Lee. Other representative examples of the use of words and emotive language can be 
found in the foreign publications that get translated for inoSMI, an abbreviation for foreign press: 
“two types of articles dominated: on the one hand, texts –high on adjectives, historical analogies, 
and sweeping simplifications- that criticized Putin and Russia; on the other, texts that exculpated 
Russia.”136 
It is not only the selective reusing of foreign articles, thereby also adding to the quantity of 
narratives, adding negligible criticism as disinformation to the scene, it is also selective in 
translating: “emotive language is generally ratcheted up, e.g. “disastrous” became “fatal”, while 
sensitive details are toned down, e.g. “the shooting down of” flight MH17 became “the fall of flight 
MH17.”137 
The use of testimonial is widely described by several authors. As Schimpfossl described: 
“those pundits, anchors and reporters who are involved in the direct promotion of Kremlin 
positions usually have consciously and deliberately chosen to do so. The more famous they are, the 
more partake in the production of political discourses.”138 Not only do they deliberately participate, 
they actively form the news too, according to Yablokov. He states that Kiselev’s show “can have a 
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powerful impact on the way that other Russian media outlets cover important stories.”139 It is in this 
same sense that the monitoring report has described that these public agents “behaved as if they 
were the experts, presenting their own opinion as facts.” 140 They also observed that many of the 
people invited to the shows were the same people that promoted the official line of the Kremlin.141 
The use of conspiracy theories in Russia is extensively described by multiple scholars, 
among others Marlene Laruelle, expert on Russia, and professor Russian politics Richard Sakwa but 
also novelist Viktor Pelevin. Pelevin argues that in early 20th century Russia “the overarching 
atmosphere was one of conspiracies, or rather, of multiple conspiracies that had somehow 
penetrated every corner of the cultural imaginary.”142 This development is also described by 
Laruelle: “since the liberalizing of speech and privatization of the Russian publishing market, books 
devoted to conspiracy theories against Russia, secrets of world history, or undisclosed negotiations 
between major world leaders, from Alexander the Great and Napoleon to Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, 
have become legion.” Goble links this to the idea that this is actually part of an organized attempt: 
“the main thing the fanatics want is to divert the attention of the population away from its real 
problems to a mythologized enemy.  And that tendency is reinforced by the inclination of Russians 
to believe in conspiracies as the explanation for everything.”143 The presence of conspiracy theories 
on the main news broadcasts as a reactive form of disinformation are described by political scientist 
Elizaveta Gaufman in an article on the Russian media in the framing of the Ukraine crisis: 
“Conspiracy theories reached their apogee after the downing of Malaysian airlines flight MH17… 
[First Channel] reported that the Ukrainian military may have “confused” the Malaysian plain with 
Putin’s presidential plane … it is surprising how persistently it was reported on [First Channel] and 
Rossiya 1.”144 
 
 
 
FALSITY 
Weiss and Pomerantsev argue that falsities are common in Russian media. Like lies spread by 
television hosts: “False assurances are common, especially in the shows of Dmitry Kiselyov”145 
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142 Quoted in R. Sakwa, ‘Conspiracy Narratives as a Mode of Engagement in International Politics: The Case of 
the 2008 Russo-Georgian War’, The Russian Review (2012:71) p. 588 
143 Goble, ‘Hot Issue – Lies, Damned Lies and Russian Disinformation’ 
144 E. Gaufman, ‘Memory, Media, and Securitization: Russian Media Framing of the Ukrainian Crisis’, in: Journal 
of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society: Russian Media and the War in Ukraine (2015:1) p. 163 
145 Weiss & Pomerantsev (2014) p. 11 
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However, they also point at another development: “The underlying mind-set of the kremlin’s 
political technologists exploits the idea that “truth” is a lost cause and that reality is essentially 
malleable, and the instant, easy proliferation of fakes and copies on the internet makes it the ideal 
forum to spread such ideas.”146 The idea is that it is easier to produce new lies to distract from a 
debunked story: “while it is true that people might not like being lied to, neither do the producers of 
the falsehoods mind having their myths busted.”147 
The monitoring report also mentions the use of lies, however, as part of large diversity of 
manipulative messages: “manipulative use of images and sound, pseudo-diversity of opinions, 
mixing comments and opinions, appeals to fear, scapegoating, demonizing the enemy, lack of 
transparency and credibility of sources, selective coverage, omission of information, manipulative 
search for sympathizers, labelling and stereotyping, vagueness, repetition and exaggeration, 
inaccurate reporting and lies etc.”148 
CONCLUSION 
Even though disinformation is often mentioned in popular literature on Russia, it is often not 
completely clear what the authors mean by disinformation. In several ways the secondary literature 
provides an idea of disinformation present in Russia. The literature largely confirms the presence of 
the characteristics of disinformation as established in the previous chapter. It is however not an 
overwhelming proof, for the description at times do not completely correspond. The characteristics 
that are mentioned include: mixture of fact and fiction, conspiracy theories, abandoning the idea of 
truth, to create as many competing narratives as possible, and coverage on MH17 and the murder of 
Nemtsov  as disinformation campaigns. 
It is because of the difference between mentions of these campaigns that create an overload 
of competing narratives, and the overall development of an entertainment culture that eliminates 
the notion of ‘truth’, that this study will divide between reactive and pro-active disinformation. In 
effect they are the same, but just as mentioned in the previous chapter, in concept they can vary. 
The Kremlin is by some authors identified as the main propagandist that controls the stream 
of disinformation, while other authors emphasize the well-willingness of the press to initiate 
disinformation by themselves. For now it will be regarded as a hybrid, for this is an element for 
further analysis in the next chapter. What certainly can be stated, however, is that the Kremlin has a 
great potential influence on the media landscape.  
                                                             
146 Ibidem, p. 17 
147 Ibidem, p. 39 
148 EaP Civil Society Forum et al. (2015) p. 5 
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According to the authors, falsity is largely common in the Russian media, and especially 
present in the shows of Dimity Kiselev. 
Unfortunately this study has not been able to integrate a quantitative analysis for 
establishing more insight on the quantity of disinformation in Russia.  
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CHAPTER III CASE STUDY: DISINFORMATION AND THE MURDER OF 
BORIS NEMTSOV 
As in the chapter above has been described how other authors place disinformation within the 
Russian state-media, this chapter will analyse a case study as to show in more detail how 
disinformation is applied by using primary sources. It will therefore focus on the coverage in the 
Russian state-media of the murder of politician Boris Nemtsov. His death was followed by an 
intensive media campaign. The time and place of the murder made it a sensitive issue for the 
Kremlin, since his tragic death came unexpected and had happened just some meters away from the 
Kremlin walls and just a little over a day before planned anti-government protests. Before getting 
into the analysis some background on the murder and course of events is needed, as well as a 
framework for the analysis: timeframe, media consulted and method of analysis.   
Nemtsov was hit by multiple shots in his back in the night of February 27. He was walking 
home with a female companion, a Ukrainian model named Anna Duritskaya, whom he just had 
dinner with in the city centre. While walking home over the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky bridge shots 
were fired from a car. Nemtsov died instantly while his companion remained unharmed.  These facts 
were about the only public information available the first day after the tragedy. This analysis will 
focus on this first day, February the 28th, with the start of reporting on the event from about 00:40 
Moscow time. The media consulted for this analysis are a broad range of popular (textual) news 
media and the messages from television shows and broadcasts, mainly focussing on the three most 
popular channels as mentioned in chapter two: First Channel, Rossiya 1, and NTV. The most used 
textual sources are press agencies Interfax, RIA Novosti, and ITAR-TASS, not only because they 
extensively publish on the matter, also because they serve as a supplier of news messages for other 
media. In the section on quantity more sources will be mentioned as also to show that the chosen 
media are representative for a large part of the Russian state-media. Even though the examples 
presented are only small parts of the information flow, they represent the overall coverage in the 
Russian state media.149 
To establish and justify a framework for analysis is rather difficult. There is no place here for 
a large quantitative analysis of news messages. Rather than evaluating on the level of the messages 
itself, as the chapters above have shown that effect and function are named to be more important, it 
is better to look at the overall commonalities in the messages. Even though that sounds 
paradoxically for disinformation should actually distract through a multifariousness of messages, it 
is the official rhetoric that will show to be the starting point for the process. This official rhetoric 
                                                             
149 See for instance the composition of the turn of events published by TASS: 
http://tass.ru/proisshestviya/1798132, or the recap by First Channel: 1tv.ru/news/print/278760 
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therefore dominates in the coverage of the event and largely adheres to the characteristics that are 
described in the previous chapters and thus are conducive for the development of disinformation. 
3.1 THE ELEMENTS FOR ANALYSIS 
Having established the theoretical and secondary described characteristics  in the previous chapters, 
this section will follow up on this analysis by evaluating the primary sources against the framework 
of the variables intent, control, quantity, message, emotion, and falsity. Even though, messaging has 
been defined as not the most important, it will serve as an identifier for the other criteria in this 
section. As this section will show there are some words that are deliberately distributed through 
official channels that will give form to the coverage in a large amount of the media.150 These 
‘buzzwords’ show rather similar characteristics as mentioned in the criteria for language that is 
instrumental for disinformation. This section will introduce these elements for analysis in a general 
chronological order. 
An hour after the first messages of the murder appeared in the news, the first buzzword was rather 
careful introduced by the president who stated, through his spokesman Dimirty Peskov, that “it has 
the characteristics of a hit and looks like a provocation (provokatsiya) .”151 After which he 
emphasized the coincidence that it happened just a day before the planned protest march, as if the 
‘provocation’ would serve the opposition. This message is spread by practically all state-news media 
as it is the authority of the president that has made this statement.152 It is this buzzword provocation 
(provokatsiya) that subsequently starts to resonate through the coverage. Three hours later, without 
any new evidence, Peskov is again quoted in the media, now speaking on his own behalf, saying that 
“It is too early to draw any conclusions about the death of Boris Nemtsov, but with absolute 
(stoprotsentnoy) certainty we can say that this is a provocation (provokatsiya).” 153 Around this same 
time aslo show up other testimonials that claim the murder is a provocation. For instance a group of 
‘political scientists’, expressed through their director Pavel Danilin, that claim that “the murder of 
                                                             
150 See also Shuster for this observation, available at: http://time.com/3727379/putin-boris-nemtsov-
kremlin-provocation/ 
151 Interfax, ‘Putin Zayavil o provokatsionnom kharaktere ubiystva Nemtsova’ (28-02-2015, 01:50) Available 
at: http://www.interfax.ru/russia/427018, last visited: 25-09-2015 
152 See for instance RIA Novosti: http://ria.ru/incidents/20150228/1050111094.html, last visited 25-09-
2015 
153 Interfax, ‘Peskov nazval ubiystvo Nemtsova “stoprotsentnoy” provokatsiey’, (28-02-2015, 04:16) Available 
at: http://www.interfax.ru/russia/427052, last visited: 25-09-2015 
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Boris Nemtsov [is] a provocation (provokatsiya) aimed against the government.” 154 It is in this same 
message that they also mention a new buzzword that has slipped into the stream of messages: 
destabilization (destbilizaciya).  
Danilin states that “without a doubt, this rude provocation is aimed at destabilizing 
(destabilizirovat) the country.”155 Provocation and destabilization thereafter practically become one, 
the act and the goal of an obscure imagined enemy of Russia. Other public figures spread the idea of 
destabilization further, one of them former president of the Soviet Union Michail Gorbachev, who 
claims that the murder is “committed with the aim of destabilizing the situation in Russia.”156 
Another statement is from the former head of the Interior Ministry and the FSB, Sergey Stepashin:  
“I think the murder of Boris Nemtsov did not attempt to opposition, and Putin's enemies, to 
destabilize the country.” 157 This sequence of testimonials spreading the Kremlin’s buzzwords all 
started with Peskov’s initial statement. This is also observed by Time reporter Simon Shuster: 
“Putin’s spokesman set the tone … his implication was clear: the Nemtsov shooting was staged by 
Russia’s enemies, not to silence the victim but to discredit the regime he opposed.”158  
Eventually, these buzzwords get ‘standardized’ through the press releases of the 
Investigative Committee. Combined with ill-founded theories about potential motives for the 
murder provocation and destabilization become one of the ‘versions’ that the Investigative 
Committee follows upon. It is in the person of Vladimir Markin, head of the Investigative Committee 
that new guidelines for the media are presented: “The investigation is considering several versions 
of the murder: a provocation to destabilize the political situation in the country; …a version 
associated with the Islamic extremist connection … a version associated with the internal events in 
Ukraine. [And] versions related to Nemtsov’s commercial activities and personal problems.” 159 This 
framework of discussion, or rather the boundaries for discussion, eventually are explicitly ratified 
by Markin, serving as arbitrator for media coverage, warning about media that provide “unverified 
information” whisch he paradoxically calls disinformation: “”I would like to ask [the public] to take a 
                                                             
154 Tass, ‘Politologi schitayut ubiystvo Nemtsova politicheskoy provokatsiey’ (28-02-2015, 4:16) Available at: 
http://tass.ru/politika/1798244, last visited: 25-09-2015 
155 Ibidem. 
156 Interfax, ‘Gorbachev schel ubiystvo Nemtsova popytkoy destabilizirobat situatsiyu v Rossii’ (28-02-2015, 
09:21) Available at: http://www.interfax.ru/russia/427060, last visited: 25-09-2015 
157 Interfax, ‘Stepashin nazval ybiystvo Nemtsova popytkoy destabilizirovat situatsiyu v strane’ (28-02-2015, 
10:10) Available at: http://www.interfax.ru/russia/427066, last visited: 25-09-2015 
158 Shuster, ‘Inside Putin’s On-Air Machine’ 
159 Ria Novosti, ‘Ubiystvo Nemtsova: SK otrabatyvaet I politicheskie, I bytovye versii’ (28-02-2015, 13:27) 
Available at: http://ria.ru/incidents/20150228/1050162166.html, last visited: 25-09-2015 
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more accurate and balanced attitude towards such sources because they tend to be disinformation 
and often blatant provocation."160  
The official versions of the Investigative Committee also serve as the boundaries for 
discussion in the two main talk shows that evening on the main national TV channels: Vremya 
pokazhet and Spisok Norkina. The question that the hosts and the guests constantly keep repeating 
is: who benefits from this murder? (komu vygodno)161  
 The most radical coverage is combining all these accusations in stating that the murder was 
a “sacred sacrifice” (sakralnoe zhertvo). These sacred sacrifices are in these articles presented as 
necessary blood sacrifices to start color revolutions. An article in the Komsomolskaya Pravda for 
instance warns for this process: “Expert on the murder of Nemtsov: The sacred sacrifice has 
come!”162 The more aggressive accusations, however, follow in the days after the mourning 
march.163  
What all these efforts combined have in common is that the divert attention away from the 
Kremlin and politicizing. Omitting other possible explanations of the event creates a controlled 
environment wherein a phony discussion can be fully exploited. In contrast to the state-media, the 
independent media did cover all possibilities. In this way RBK for instance, did provide reflection on 
the media campaign by the state-media: “The authorities want to remove the tension and cleanse 
itself of suspicion, said president of the Centre for Political Technologies Igor Bunin.”164 Even though 
this could be regarded as just a same testimonial as the ones above, the argument of this type that 
this ‘political technologist’ shares can nowhere be found on national state-media. Igor Bunin states 
eventually what he thinks this media campaign described above is all about: “With regard to the 
allegations of the Kiev connection and sacred sacrifices, they only say that because the Investigative 
Committee has no facts and they are looking for some simple and effective words.”165 
 
INTENT & CONTROL 
                                                             
160 TASS, 'Rassledovanie ubiystva Borisa Nemtsova. Khronika sobytiy' (28-02-2015, 16:37) Available at: 
http://tass.ru/proisshestviya/1798132, last visited: 25-09-2015 
161 The talk shows can be found here: Spisok Norkina (28-02-2015): http://www.ntv.ru/video/1073460/ , 
and Vremya pokazhet (28-02-2015): http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si=5962&d=28.02.2015  
162 Komsomolskaya Pravda, ‘Ekspert ob ubiystve Nemtsova: Sakralnaya zhertva prinesena!’ (28-02-2015, 
13:44) Available at: http://www.kp.ru/daily/26348.7/3230469/, last visited: 25-09-2015 
163 See for instance: http://www.ntv.ru/video/1074520/, last visited: 25-09-2015 
164 RBK, ‘Usluga ili provokatsiya: kak vo vlastnykh krugakh kommentiruyut gibel Nemtsova’ (28-02-2015, 
15:44) Available at: http://top.rbc.ru/politics/28/02/2015/54f1aafd9a7947266747b317, last visited: 25-09-
2015 
165 Ibidem. 
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As shown above, it is clear that official buzzwords set the tone for the coverage in the first day after 
the murder. The Kremlin had motives to divert attention away from suspected government 
involvement or the humiliation of a high profile murder right next to the Kremlin walls. The first 
buzzword, at the very start of news coverage, was in the name of the highest authority, President 
Putin. It then shifted towards Dimity Peskov and finally came under authority of the Investigative 
Committee. These are the persons that in this case have spoken with authority, as Doob pointed out 
in the first chapter as a way of identifying verbal compulsions; the deliberate propagandist is the 
person who speaks frequently and with authority. This incentive should then clearly be at the 
authorities. The clear hints that should be “sensed” by reporters, as was mentioned in the second 
chapter, seemed to control the media coverage. The most exemplary being the statement by 
Vladimir Markin to adhere to the official versions of the Investigative Committee.  This way it seems 
like the disinformation campaign was a deliberate attempt to control the media coverage, however, 
it did not have to rely on pressure, but on a loyal press that can interpret public hidden messages. 
 The discussions within talk shows are strictly controlled by the hosts, as becomes clear in 
the broadcast of Vremya Pokazhet on the First Channel. Even though it is set up as a public 
discussion with a dozen commentators, the talk show host strictly decides who gets airtime. The 
person that has the most moderate opinion is physically denied the microphone after he pointed out 
that the media should not incite hatred.166 These types of control, the versions as well as the airtime 
granted by the host, imply that disinformation in this sense is not just an unlimited overload of 
messages, but an overload of messages within an approved framework. 
 
QUANTITY 
The quantity of messages covering  the murder of Nemtsov was overwhelming. However, that 
should be seen as a sincerely normal reaction to the murder of a well-known politician. The quantity 
of messages that used the words that were instigated by the Kremlin made up between ten and forty 
per cent of the coverage.167 Striking is also the omnipresence of the buzzwords in practically all 
state-media.168 Important, however, in this sense is that there was no attempt at suppressing the 
coverage of the event. 
                                                             
166 See http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si=5962&d=28.02.2015 
167 The result of combining the keywords ‘nemtsov’ and ‘provokatsiya’, set out against the total number of 
articles about Nemtsov on the websites of RIA Novosti, ITAR-TASS, and Interfax. More extensive quantitative 
analysis could prove to be insightful. 
168 S. Shuster, ‘Why the Kremlin is Blaming Putin Critic’s Murder on a ‘Provocation’’, Time (28-02-2015) 
Available at: http://time.com/3727379/putin-boris-nemtsov-kremlin-provocation/, last visited: 25-09-2015 
46 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, deliberate quantity can also be traced through open 
source analysis of digital media and social media. It is in this sense that independent newspaper 
Novaya Gazeta has shown that right after the murder the Kremlin trolls all switched from their 
usual subjects to trolling articles on Boris Nemtsov: "When Nemtsov was killed Kremlin bots 
changed work: they stopped  criticizing Ukraine and transferred to the murder. If you follow the 
news, you could see that under the hundreds of articles on the murder of Nemtsov where thousands 
of comments in which different words were repeated: this murder is a provocation, the Kremlin is 
not to blame, he was killed by the opposition to attract more people to the march.” 169 This is also 
proven by Lawrence Alexander, a Social Sciences student who analysed a network of twitter 
accounts that tweeted the same sentence about Nemtsov “Ukrainians killed him...he was stealing 
one of their girlfriends”, just hours after the murder. In this analysis he found out that there were 
2900 bots spreading this same message. 170 
MESSAGE & EMOTION 
First of all, the buzzwords introduced by state officials are similar to the omnibus words that have 
been described in the first chapter. They are deliberately vague and create a strong emotional 
reaction. Provoktsiya has in Russia more emotional charge then the English provocation. According 
to Shuster, the term translated into English “does not begin to capture its ability in Russian to shift 
blame and manipulate suspicion.”171 
It is also this vagueness that in turn stimulates the creation of conspiracy theories. The 
phrase ‘who benefits?’ is in the same sense an impetus for the creation of all sorts of theories, or 
versions, and thus in turn creating more disinformation. An example of such continuously creating of 
conspiracy theories is for instance also to find in the TASS interview with Danilin, who is convinced 
that the murder has been planned long before by the Ukrainian secret services, and that the crime 
scene so close to the Kremlin was planned just as the killing of Anna Politkovskaya on Putin’s 
birthday.172 Interestingly these types of wild, unsubstantiated arguments are not met with any 
scepticism by the press agency. 
                                                             
169 D. Khachatryan, ‘Kak stat trollxanterom’, Novaya Gazeta (11-03-2015) Available at: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/67574.html, last visited: 25-09-2015 
170 L. Alexander, ‘Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin’s Twitter Bot Campaign’, Global Voices 
(02-04-2015) Available at: http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/04/02/analyzing-kremlin-twitter-
bots/comment-page-3/, last visited: 25-09-2015 
171 Shuster, ‘Why the Kremlin is Blaming Putin Critic’s Murder on a ‘Provocation’’ 
172 Tass, ‘Politologi schitayut ubiystvo Nemtsova politicheskoy provokatsiey’ 
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As was became also clear from the section above was the use of testimonial as a constant 
confirmation and further spread of the buzzwords, creating a diverse coverage within the desired 
framework. Political scientists, duma speakers, former politicians, and many other types of public 
figures support the initial storyline by Peskov and continue themselves to create more 
disinformation. The origin of the testimonials also shows how there is no distinction in political 
affiliations in supporting the disinformation campaign, for the communists participate even more 
radically. The first deputy chairman of the CPRF Central Committee and first vice-speaker of the 
State Duma Ivan Melnikov states in a TASS interview that, “if you look at it from a political 
perspective … that it is a same bloody provocation , organized for the same reasons as shooting 
down of [MH17].”173 These testimonials do have another advantage for serving to create more 
overload of messages, as they practically all state the same only just in other words. This creates 
more messages without adding new information while at the same time overloading the audience. 
In talk shows it also becomes clear that it is not just the same discussion that perpetuates 
within the small framework, but even more so that is the same emotional trigger that is repeated: 
fear.174 This is at the same time combined with righteous speech on the need for finding the killers 
and bringing justice.175 
 
FALSITY 
The use of testimonial and emotional omnibus words indicate that lying is not a necessity. The 
creation of false associations and referring to statements by other public figures divert away from 
questions about truth. Instead the emotional falsity is exploited, creating false emotional relations. 
On the other hand, in order to support various conspiracy theories, sometimes falsehoods are 
created to form a story, like for instance the manipulation of aerial photography.176 As the case 
study of Nemtsov however showed, there is no real use of blatant lies to support the different 
theories. Instead, suggestive arguments and supplying a framework for exposing emotional 
opinions creates enough distraction. 
  
                                                             
173 TASS, 'Rassledovanie ubiystva Borisa Nemtsova. Khronika sobytiy' 
174 See for instance Vremya pokazhet (28-02-2015) Available at: 
http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si=5962&d=28.02.2015, last visited: 25-09-2015 
175 See for instance TASS, ‘Putin: budet Delano vse, chtoby organizatory I ispolniteli ubiystva Nemtsova byli 
nakazany’ (28-02-2015, 1600) Available at: http://tass.ru/politika/1798913, last visited: 25-09-2015 
176 M. Tucker, ‘Meet Eliot Higgins, Putin’s MH17 Nemesis’, Newsweek (22-06-2015) Available at: 
http://www.newsweek.com/meet-eliot-higgins-putins-mh17-nemesis-345485, last visited: 25-09-2015 
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CONCLUSION 
In three stages this study has shed some first academic light on the presence of disinformation in 
the Russian media. By first setting the framework for analysis, through analysing the limited 
academic descriptions of disinformation, the characteristics of disinformation have been described 
in detail. In the second chapter secondary sources that mention the presence and techniques of 
Russian propaganda and disinformation have been compared with the characteristics from the 
framework. And third a case study focussing on the coverage of the murder of Nemtsov in the 
Russian state-media has led to new insights on the presence of disinformation in Russia. 
By using the information from the previous chapters, and separating the analysis along the 
lines of the characteristics intent, control, quantity, message, emotion and falsity, this study can now 
answer the research question: How is disinformation applied in the coverage of the murder of Boris 
Nemtsov in the Russian state-media? 
Concerning the matter of intent and control, the disinformation surrounding the murder of 
Nemtsov can be divided in three stages of influence. Even though control is exerted on the media as 
a whole to behave to the kremlin standards, this analysis has shown that only the first incentive of 
disinformation comes from the authorities and this control is not exerted directly, but through 
keywords and the setting the boundaries for the discussion. The second step is for public figures to 
repeat and further develop stories within the framework to create substance for disinformation. 
The third stage is for the reporters to fill up the coverage by self-initiating stories that will further 
develop the quantity of messages and the range of conspiracy theories within the framework.  
The framework is carefully guided by the authorities and therefore disinformation is not 
exactly the same as an information overload, as is it only overload within the boundaries. As the 
coverage of the murder of Nemtsov has shown, there is no direct need for lies to create stories. 
Testimonials by public figures provide the state-media with a function as a supplier of a framework 
for interpretation, making the media less vulnerable for criticism. 
The buzzwords used in the disinformation, like provokatsiya and destabilizatsiya, are vague, 
suggestive, and highly emotional and therefore create all sorts of negative associations of fear and 
guilt. They are moreover created out of nowhere by public figures all making the same point, saying 
practically the same, varying between different conspiracy theories. 
However, this disinformation described surrounding the murder of Nemtsov should be 
considered reactive disinformation, which is different from all year round around proactive 
disinformation. The latter has more in common with infotainment and palaver. Most interestingly, 
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the authorities can apparently switch to a reactive disinformation campaign within a matter of 
hours. 
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